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Five Ways AI Is Not Like the Manhattan Project (and One Way It Is) 
  
Joseph D. Martin and Marta Halina 
  
Calls for a Manhattan Project–style crash effort to develop artificial intelligence (AI) technology 
are thick on the ground these days. Oren Etzioni, the CEO of the Allen Institute for Artificial 
Intelligence, recently issued such a call on The Hill. The analogy is commonly used to describe 
DeepMind’s initiative to build artificial general intelligence (AGI). It is similarly used to describe 
military initiatives to build AGI. At a conference last year, DARPA announced a $2 billion 
investment in AI over the next five years. Ron Brachman, former director of DARPA’s cognitive 
systems initiative, said at this conference that a Manhattan Project is likely needed to “create an 
AI system that has the competence of a three-year old.” 
 
In one sense, the goals of such analogies are clear. AI, the comparison implies, has the 
potential to be as transformative for our society as nuclear weapons were in the mid-twentieth 
century. Whoever masters it first will enjoy a massive head start on the next wave of 
technological development, economic competition, and, yes, the arms race of the twenty-first 
century. It’s a project that comes with ethical implications that demand focused and well-
resourced attention. These consequences are so important that we should not bat an eye at 
ploughing limitless resources into its development. 
 
But if this analogy is to sustain such a bold claim, it bears closer scrutiny. First, analogies of this 
sort are not innocuous. Invocations of historical examples, especially examples so iconic as the 
Manhattan Project or the Apollo program, aim to borrow the authority—and implications of 
success—that such historical episodes command. It is prudent to examine analogies to see if 
that authority is merited, or if it has been unjustly swiped. 
 
Second, analogies might highlight unexpected features of a problem by highlighting similarities 
between something we don’t understand well and something we do, but they also constrain our 
thinking. They compel us to discuss problems in certain terms and think about their 
consequences in certain ways. The historical analogies we allow to dominate our discussion of 
AI therefore have crucial consequences for how we think about its future. This is particularly 
important to note in the case of AI, where broad foresight and flexible strategies are required to 
ensure that we harness new technologies in ways that are beneficial for all. 
 
Is the current development of AI like the Manhattan Project? In many critical ways, it is not. 
 
This is not to suggest that AI doesn’t have the potential to visit widespread changes on the 
world—it might very well do just that. But the analogy, on closer examination, doesn’t hold up. 
The following five ways in which it breaks down tells us a great deal about how we might think 
about AI in more useful ways. 
 
 
1. The hard scientific work was done before the Manhattan Project started. 
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One of the biggest myths about the Manhattan Project is that it was a triumph of nuclear 
physics. It was not. By the time it was instituted in 1942, it could rely on about a half-century of 
atomic and nuclear physics. 
  
The neutron was discovered in 1930, joining the proton and electron as the particles that 
explained the structure of all known elements. The general properties of the nucleus and the 
essential principles governing nucleon interactions were worked out through the 1930s—
including the principles of nuclear fission. Very little nuclear physics had to be done during the 
Manhattan Project in order to accomplish its goals. 
  
This is not the circumstance that currently prevails in AI research. We do not understand the 
principles that ground intelligence—biological or artificial. Although we have advanced 
considerably in our understanding of the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying 
sophisticated behaviour in human and nonhuman animals, we still lack even a basic 
understanding of how animals succeed in flexibly learning and reasoning about the physical and 
social world. One can of course reframe the goal of AI research from one of achieving artificial 
general intelligence to one of developing systems that excel at particular tasks, such as playing 
chess, driving a car, or generating cake recipes. In the case of artificial narrow intelligences 
(ANIs) such as these, however, there is no overarching project that lends itself to being 
compared to the Manhattan Project, but rather a multitude of distinct projects and aims, each of 
which must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
 
The Manhattan Project rewarded the resources invested in it because it proceeded from well-
understood principles. A crash funding program for an area where the principles are unknown or 
in flux would be a much riskier investment. 
 
 
2. The Manhattan Project addressed a highly constrained technical problem. 
  
The question of how you build a nuclear bomb is complicated, but clear. The Manhattan 
Project’s goal was therefore well defined. If you know that once you pack enough of a certain 
type of atom into a small enough space, it will explode, then it’s just a matter of how you do the 
packing. 
 
The Manhattan Project, to be sure, required a massive engineering effort. The $2 billion 
dedicated to the cause was directed primarily at technical problems: How do you separate 
enough of Uranium-235, the fissionable isotope, from the much more abundant and much more 
stable Uranium-238? How do you manufacture enough Plutonium to sustain an explosive 
nuclear reaction? How do you get that Plutonium to detonate properly given that its properties 
prevent it from working like a simple Uranium bomb in which it’s possible to unite two sub-critical 
masses into one supercritical mass? 
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These were the difficult problems of nuclear weapons design, and as a result, the answers to 
them were classified. What was not classified was the basic research carried out by nuclear 
physicists before and after the war: this was published and accessible, contributing in large part 
to the myth that the Manhattan Project was a triumph of physical research. 
 
But most problems are not like this. General AI is not like this. We do not have a set of clear, 
well-defined problems that can form the focus of a massive technical effort. We don’t even 
agree about how we would know if we had genuine AGI. Debates in animal cognition research 
show how difficult it is to come to a consensus concerning what counts as generally intelligent 
and what constitutes an appropriate test for identifying sophisticated cognition and behaviour. In 
contrast, after the Trinity test, everyone at the Manhattan Project knew that they’d succeeded. 
One could again shift the focus from AGI to ANI—the criteria for success in the latter case is 
typically unambiguous (often it’s to outperform the best human in the task). However, one must 
then be clear that the comparison being made does not concern artificial general intelligence or 
AI generally, but rather a particular program designed or trained to succeed on a particular task, 
like facial recognition or missile guidance. 
 
 
3. Massive brain drain in the 1930s led to a high concentration of world experts in one 
place, all working toward one (military-enforced) goal. 
 
The 1930s saw a massive migration of intellectuals out of Central Europe, many of whom had 
been instrumental in developing the new physics underwriting the very possibility of nuclear 
weapons. A great many of these individuals came to the United States, which, conveniently, 
was just maturing as a scientific nation. 
 
The European physicists and mathematicians coming to the United States and gaining posts in 
American universities therefore integrated with a young, energetic generation of American 
physicists. This was a historically unusual concentration of expertise, and the entry of the United 
States into World War II meant that almost all of the people with the most relevant talents were 
able to be conscripted into the effort to build the bomb. 
 
The disanalogy with AI in this case is clear. Certainly, many talented people work on AI, but by 
no means are they all bending to the same oars. The fact that AI is being developed within a 
corporatized, profit-driven environment means that it is responding to fundamentally different 
incentives, which imply a fundamentally different distribution of expertise. 
 
Many of those advocating for AI development would be aghast at the suggestion that the world’s 
(or at least a country’s) experts be plucked from their jobs, sequestered in a remote government 
laboratory and placed under a draconian secrecy regime. But such were the measures 




AI is a twenty-first century technology being developed primarily by twenty-first century 
businesses. Any large-scale, Manhattan-style investment would have to come from twenty-first 
century states struggling to balance it against many other competing technical and social 
priorities, with neither the clout nor expectation of compliance necessary to attain a similar 
concentration of expertise. Of course, things could move in this direction, and may already be 
doing so with, for example, China’s civil-military fusion, but we imagine many working in AI 
outside of the military context do not mean to encourage this when drawing on an analogy with 
the Manhattan Project. 
 
 
4. The level of investment in the Manhattan Project was unprecedented. 
 
The Manhattan Project cost $2 billion. In today’s money, that’s about $30 billion or £22.5 
billion—all concentrated on the same well-coordinated project. This remains the sort of funding 
that you can only get for a technical or scientific project if you have the single-minded devotion 
of a wealthy state behind you. And then probably only during wartime. 
  
When the US Congress canceled the Superconducting Super Collider in 1993, its cost had crept 
up to just $12 billion, or about $1.4 billion in World War II–era dollars. That scale of funding for 
major projects has proved extremely difficult to commit in peacetime, especially to non-military 
projects. We might see that scale of investment in AI worldwide over the course of several 
decades, but that does not amount to the concentrated funding of the Manhattan Project. 
 
Dozens of governments have released or announced their intention to release AI strategies in 
the last two years, including the new American AI Initiative signed February this year. Many of 
these initiatives have money attached to them, ranging from millions to nearly two billion USD. 
Although most of these strategies have industrialization and scientific research as their top 
priorities, they concern a wide range of technologies and applications. In no case are we near 
Manhattan-like numbers on any given project. 
 
 
5. The Manhattan Project proceeded with the fierce urgency motivated by the threat of 
Nazism. 
  
Hitler’s bomb project, it turned out, was a dud. Many brilliant physicists, including Werner 
Heisenberg and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, remained in Germany and worked on it, but it 
lacked all the other factors that we’ve described here and was nowhere near creating a working 
weapon by the end of the war. 
  
But, of course, no one among the allies knew that at the time. Germany had been the heartland 
of modern physics before World War II, and the assumption remained that they had therefore 
begun with a head start. A singleness of purpose and the sense of a real and immediate 
existential threat lit a fire under the researchers and technicians working on the bomb. 
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Whatever our concerns about AI, they don’t quite reach that scale. And because, as a technical 
project, it lacks the specificity of the bomb, it’s difficult to see how it could. 
  
 
One way that it is… 
 
For these reasons at least, we should be suspicious of comparisons with the Manhattan Project. 
It was the product of a peculiar and delicate set of historical circumstances. Starting from the 
state of affairs in 1942, it is remarkable that, from a standstill, the Manhattan Project was able to 
create two types of working weapon in three years. 
 
For that to happen, the science had to be in just the right place, the problem had to be clear and 
focused, the right concentration of expertise had to materialize, nearly inexhaustible funds had 
to be devoted to the project, and those working on it had be scared to death of what would 
happen if they failed. 
 
None of those properly apply to the current state of affairs in artificial intelligence. 
 
But one strong point of analogy remains between AI and the Manhattan Project. We tend to 
think of the Manhattan Project as a success. But that’s only a straightforward assessment if we 
limit our criteria of success to gadget production. “Success” in AI means a great deal more that 
creating something that works. It also means managing it successfully. 
 
Here it’s not so clear that the Manhattan Project was a success. The bombs it created were 
used against civilian populations—over the objections of many of the scientists involved. The 
arms race it set off reshaped global politics for decades, and we are still grappling with those 
effects. These were challenges Manhattan scientists anticipated, at least in part, but the project 
itself was ineffective at formulating a response. 
 
However good technical specialists are at bringing technology into being, their visions for how, 
when, and why that technology should be used often hold little sway with the people charged 
with making those decisions. 
 
Nuclear scientists notably failed to control how nuclear weapons were used. The Franck Report, 
written by a group of concerned nuclear physicists at the University of Chicago, urged strongly 
that the bomb should not be deployed in a military capacity. Their motivation involved 
anticipating a great deal of what would come to pass during the Cold War: an arms race, 
increased international tensions, the difficulty of international control, erosion of American moral 
authority. 
  
But the technology was nevertheless used in ways that suited the systems of authority in place 
at the time. That’s something that we can expect to carry over to any products of AI research. 
Both the Manhattan Project and AI are inextricably bound up in global politics. Countries like the 
United States, Russia, China, and South Korea already take AI to be critical to future military 
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power. As Russian president Vladimir Putin put it, the country that takes the lead in AI will be 
"the ruler of the world." Within this context, the analogy to the Manhattan Project is clear: AI, like 
the development of the atomic bomb, is a tool that many want to develop in the service of 
securing global military power. Although this is true, the analogy still falls apart for the reasons 
stated above, and many who make this comparison do so without the military implications in 
mind. Thus, we would encourage alternative framings. 
 
 
What is AI like, if not the Manhattan Project? 
 
Both the proselytes and naysayers of artificial intelligence undoubtedly have some things right. 
But any claims for new technologies need to be evaluated both on their own merits and in light 
of an understanding of history that goes beyond glib sloganeering. 
 
Happily, an abundance of such understanding is available in the history of science and 
technology. AI is widely distributed, connected to many other technologies, and managed by 
intricate and overlapping regimes of funding and influence. In that sense, it has more in 
common with the electrical grid than it does with nuclear weapons. 
 
The electrical grid arose in a piecemeal way. Its implementation was accompanied by 
considerable disagreement about the form it should take and who should control it. It was 
integrated gradually with existing systems. Its effects were pervasive, but diffuse. Arising first in 
the private sector, it had to be subjected to regulatory structures before it could work at large 
scales. 
 
Examples like this much better capture the effects of most technologies we care about. But we 
tend to avoid them, for the obvious reason that they lack a certain flair. Nuclear weapons are 
evocative and eye-catching; the electrical grid is pedestrian and mundane. 
 
But perhaps we need a little mundanity in AI. The comparison with nuclear weapons has the 
unfortunate side effect that it tends to motivate competing utopian and dystopian visions, 
crowding out discussion about the ways AI might make small but influential changes in existing 
systems. The problems that threaten humanity (poverty, disease, ecological destruction, war) 
will not be solved by engineering a magic bullet, no matter how many talented people we bring 
to the table. Although new AI technologies are extremely powerful and this power can be 
harnessed for good, this must be done through the painstaking coordination of diverse groups 
and infrastructures and in conversation with those who are ultimately meant to benefit. 
